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 1 Introduction
Which households repay their debts and which borrowers default? Which
factors aﬀect repayment behavior, and how large are the eﬀects? This
paper addresses these questions and provides some evidence using data
provided by the leading lender of unsecured credit to the Italian house-
hold sector. Credit markets in Italy are small by EU standards, but they
grew quite rapidly over the past 20 years, as well documented by Caso-
laro, Gambacorta and Guiso (2005). The trend is similar for consumer
credit (e.g. non-housing debt), which accounts for 8.1 percent of the
GDP in 2003 and is largely unsecured. Theory predicts that incentives
to repay depend crucially on how default is punished.
This paper provides a methodology to deal with the econometric is-
sues that arise when one uses lenders’ data to investigate the factor af-
fecting repayment behavior. Lenders’ data have a number of advantages.
Since the data record the repayment history of applicants who were given
credit, this allows us to observe default, which is a rare event in general
household surveys. Even on the few occasions appropriate questions on
default are included, this is likely to be underreported.1 A second advan-
tage is that administrative data records all the variables that aﬀect the
decision to lend, while survey data typically has only a subset of them.
However, lenders’ data typically allow to identify only the repayment be-
havior for those who are granted credit. To the extent that non-rejected
applicants are a selected sample from the population of applicants, one
cannot draw reliable policy implications from the observation of non-
1For example, Fay, Hurst and White (2002) found that only around 250 US house-
holds reported ﬁling for bankruptcy in the 1996 wave of the PSID, around half the
national ﬁling rate. Moreover, and more seriously, only a small proportion of house-
holds in serious arrears subsequently ﬁles for bankruptcy.
1rejected applicants only.
The standard way of coping with the issue is to ﬁnd some exclusion re-
strictions that aﬀect the rejection rule but not the repayment behavior.
However, these exclusion restrictions are often implausible for lenders’
data, since the variables recorded in the administrative archives are used
to screen the applicants on the grounds that they predict the chances of
default and therefore repayment behavior. To overcome such diﬃculty,
we describe an alternative identiﬁcation method which places upper and
lower bounds on the true eﬀect. We also show how simple, and plausi-
ble, assumptions about the behaviour of the lender (that they lend to
good risk and refuse credit to bad risks) can narrow the bounds on the
estimates.
This study uses a novel data-set drawn directly from the adminis-
trative records of the leading lender of unsecured credit to the Italian
household sector. The data provide detailed information on the charac-
teristics of contracts, customers, repayment and, importantly, rejected
applications. This information is crucial if one wants to draw inference
on household repayment behavior, and to account for the fact that house-
holds granted credit are likely to be diﬀerent from and those which are
refused.
The paper analyzes the role of several factors aﬀecting repayment be-
havior and also focus on how the quality of judicial enforcement and the
availability of informal credit markets aﬀect households’ default on con-
sumer credit contracts.2 The incentives for individuals to default depends
on the penalty incurred when not repaying. If the debt is collateralized,
2An issue left for future research is to study the eﬀect of information sharing
through credit bureaus on repayment. To investigate such an issue one needs using
data coming form lenders adopting diﬀerent information sharing policies.
2and the debt is not repayed, then the property pledged as collateral is
transferred to the creditor. The speed with which the asset is transferred
depends, among others things, on how long it takes for the court to en-
force the contract. Thus, a more tardy enforcement of debts enforcing
makes it less costly for the borrower to fail to repay. But a slow and
costly judicial enforcement procedure can also have an important role
when the debt is not collateralized, in that it might discourage lenders
from court action should the borrower default.
Using data on civil trials provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT), Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco (2004) and Fabbri and Padula
(2005) document the eﬀect of judicial enforcement on credit to ﬁrms
and to households, respectively. Both studies exploit the large variation
across Italy in judicial enforcement, and ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects on access
to credit. Our approach is similar, with variation in the quality of judicial
institutions playing a major role in the analysis. However, in contrast
to these papers, the focus is on consumer credit market, which is mostly
unsecured. Moreover, we investigate the eﬀect of judicial enforcement
and of informal credit markets on borrowers’ repayment behavior and
not on borrowing restrictions.
The value of non-housing consumer loans is typically small and poorly
collateralized (even for installment credit, the resale value of the good
would rarely cover the outstanding debt). Failure to pay, in such circum-
stances, often only amounts to being blacklisted and excluded from future
borrowing in formal credit markets.3 The cost of exclusion will thus de-
pend on whether alternative sources of credit are available. Households
with access to alternative sources of credit are likely to view the deter-
3Unlike the US, institutions that specialize in subprime lending to households with
poor credit histories are absent in Italy.
3rent eﬀect of exclusion from the formal sector less seriously, and thus have
lower incentives to repay debts incurred there. Among alternative credit
providers, an important role is played by informal credit markets: around
3% of Italian households are indebted to family and friends. This is not
a negligible number: just below 11% of Italian households are indebted
with banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.4
Other than aﬀecting the borrowers’ outside option, there is another
important way in which ﬁnancial help from relatives or friends might
aﬀect repayment behavior. As emphasized in a number of papers (see
for instance Ghosh, Mookherjee and Ray, 2000), family networks have
access to a better monitoring technology, and thus can lend to borrowers
who would otherwise be unable to pay their debts in the formal sector.
This can enable ﬁnancially troubled borrowers to meet their payments
on consumer credit contracts even when their assets would not otherwise
allow them to do so, and consequently makes default less likely. The
paper will thus investigate whether the availability of family and friends’
ﬁnancial help makes borrower default more, or less, likely.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some
background literature. The data are described in Section 3, while Section
4 deals with the selection issues involved in the use of lenders’ data.
Section 5 discusses parametric and semi-parametric estimation. Section
6 presents the results and 7 concludes.
4Moreover, data from the Consumer Credit and Lending to Households in Europe
- ECRI 2005 Statistical Package reveal that between 2000 and 2004 the ratio between
consumer credit and disposable income is just above 5%; in the Bank of Italy Survey
of Household Income and Wealth such ratio is around 4%.
42 Background literature
The early literature on the lender-borrower relationship showed how
asymmetric information could cause banks and other lenders to restrict
access to credit (see, for instance, the pioneering work of Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981). In these models, default is exogenous but creditors can
not tell a priori which agents will default and which will not, hence they
oﬀer the same contract to all borrowers. In contrast, Jaﬀee and Russell
(1976) discussed how agents who do not bear the full consequences of
their actions may indulge in riskier behaviour and thus are more likely to
default on their debts. While this literature considered entrepreneurs, the
insights are also relevant for consumption smoothing. In a more recent
literature, Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996) explicitly
model the decision to default of inﬁnitely lived consumers in a general
equilibrium framework. Whether households default depends on how
severely they are punished: agents compare the punishment for default
with the gain from not repaying their debts. In these models, default is
punished by autarky; permanent exclusion from borrowing and saving in
all future time periods. These studies show that credit constraints would
arise endogenously since above some maximum level of debt, default is
assured, and it is never rational for lenders to extend credit beyond this
level. A key point in this literature is that incentives to default depend
on the agents’ outside option. In empirical studies this is important since
debtors can not be permanently excluded from credit markets. In the
US, for example, bankruptcy can not be recorded in credit ﬁles for more
than 10 years, and in practice, these households gain access to credit
and to saving instruments much more quickly. Moreover, informal credit
channels, such as friends and family, may be available to such households
5without interruption. Incentives to default will also depend on the cost
of enforcing debts, in terms of both money and the time it takes for
lenders to recover their debts. Making the enforcement of debt contracts
more diﬃcult makes lending less attractive for lenders. This paper will
explicitly deal with these two issues.
While the relation between credit contracts and both the legal rules
and their enforcement is widely studied (see for instance Fay, Hurst and
White, 2002, Grant, 2003, and Fabbri and Padula, 2004), much less
it has been said on the eﬀect of non-market sources of credit. In a
very diﬀerent context, Banerjee and Newman (1998) show that these
alternative credit sources can have important eﬀects on development.
They argue that in the formal sector, informational asymmetries can
be large, while they are much smaller in the informal sector in which
agents behaviour can be much more easily observed: friends and family
are likely to know whether people they know closely are reliable and will
repay their debts. In contrast, our paper provides empirical evidence
(albeit on credit to consumers not producers) showing that those types
of household for which informal credit is more common are less likely to
repay their debts in the formal sector, everything else being equal.
3 Data
We take data from three diﬀerent sources, described in turn. For in-
formation on borrowing, we have a unique data set which consists of a
random sample of households that are in the full administrative database
of Findomestic Banca for 1996 - 1999. Findomestic specializes in non-
mortgage lending to the Italian household sector, much of it (61 percent
in our sample) via instalment credit made available by the retailer at the
6point of sale. The bank also supplies revolving credit (37 percent of the
contracts in our sample) in the form of credit cards. Lastly, and rather
less importantly, the bank oﬀers personal loans, a market which it has
entered more recently. Our lender is the market leader for these types
of credit in Italy. In the data, the median debt is only 700 euros. Even
though much of the debt is instalment credit, in practice the recovery
value of the good which was purchased is small, hence our lender treats
all the loans as unsecured, and does not attempt to repossess the good.5
In 1999, the last year for which we have data, our lender had three
million customers in their credit records. From this they have provided
a random sample of approximately 120,000 clients, and since clients may
have more than one contract, we have information on roughly 200,000
contracts. The lender has made all its customer information available
to us, except the speciﬁc credit score for the customer. The lender’s
aim in collecting the data is to identify suitable consumers with which
to build long-term relationships, such as middle-income families with
steady jobs. The data records all applications that have been made by
the household; whether credit was granted; and the repayment history of
the household for each debt contract. The data also includes information
about the household’s characteristics, such as date of birth of the head
and of the spouse, the profession of household members, the province
5Their bad debts are sold to agencies which specialize in debt recovery. Moreover,
our lender oﬀers standard debt contracts and the interest rate on their contracts does
not diﬀer across borrowers. Loan applications are either granted at the prevailing
interest rate, or the request is turned down. Edelberg (2003) showed that systemati-
cally oﬀering diﬀerent interest rates to diﬀerent agents, conditional on the borrowers
observable characteristics (known as ‘risk-based pricing’ in the industry) is a compar-
atively recent phenomenon even in the US, and it is not currently practiced by Italian
lenders.
7and region of residence, seniority in the profession of the head and of the
spouse, housing tenure, number of children, income and marital status.
For each client, we have information on all current and past contracts
and all applications (including rejected applications), for each of the three
types of loans that are granted. Moreover, some of the loans, although
authorized by the lender, were not activated by the customer.
For activated contracts, we have information on the type of contract,
the amount ﬁnanced or the credit limit, the amount repaid or the credit
actually extended, and the currently outstanding debt and repayment
status of the borrower. The data for accepted applicants is a cross sec-
tional snapshot of all existing contracts, containing ﬁnancial information
on each contracts (including the price of the good, the item ﬁnanced,
the amount of credit extended, and the currently outstanding debt), as
well as some demographics and other background information on the
customer. For revolving credit, it includes the outstanding amount and
the credit limit. The data also includes the bank’s evaluation of the
customer and the contract in terms of the repayment behavior of the
borrower. More details on pricing and contracts can be found in Bertola,
Hochguertel and Koeniger (2005) and Bicakova (2007). In about 15 per-
cent of cases, applicants are refused credit. We have a random sample
consisting of 5 percent of these rejected applications. This ﬁle records
information similar to that which we have for accepted applicants. A
few households have been rejected on some applications and have been
successful in others.
To ensure our measure of default is as close as possible to actual
default, we will concentrate on the installment credit contracts that are
expired.6 Moreover, we select only customers for which we have complete
6Section 6.2 shows that the results are similar if we also include contracts which
8information on the profession of household members, the province and
region of residence, seniority in the profession of the head and of the
spouse, housing tenure, number of children, income and marital status.
This leaves us with almost 85,000 accepted and rejected applications.
Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber (2005) compare the data against a
representative survey of the Italian population, the Survey of Household
Income and Wealth. Compared to the Italian population as a whole, the
households in our sample of credit applications are younger, are more
likely to be living in the South, more likely to rent and have lower income
than is typical of the Italian population. This is also documented in table
1, which focuses on both rejected and non-rejected applications in 1996
and 1998 and shows that Findomestic costumers are less likely to be self-
employed, less likely to own their homes, and less likely to have a bank
account.
An advantage of using administrative data is that measurement er-
ror is likely to be reduced compared to survey data. Since the lender
uses this information when screening the applicant and when assessing
whether action needs to be taken against borrowers in arrears, it has
strong incentives to ensure its accuracy. However, administrative data
contains less information about the characteristics of the household than
most survey data, and any data on the household is self-reported by the
applicant (who may have incentives to report falsely). Standard consis-
tency checks on the data have been carried out as described in Alessie,
Hochguertel and Weber (2005).
In order to construct our indicators of judicial eﬃciency and of bor-
rowing from friends and relatives, we use two other data sources: the data
on civil trials, provided by ISTAT, and the Survey of Household Income
have not come to the end of the agreed repayment period.
9and Wealth (SHIW), a household level survey conducted by the Bank of
Italy almost every second year. The ﬁrst of these two data-sets is used to
measure the quality of judicial enforcement, the second to construct an
indicator that captures the availability of ‘non-market’ credit providers,
such as relatives and friends. Judicial eﬃciency is proxied by the average
length of trials in the civil courts in each Italian judicial district using
data from the Annuario di Statistiche Giudiziarie for 1989-2000, pub-
lished by ISTAT. The same proxy is used in Jappelli, Pagano and Bianco
(2005).
Figure 1 plots the average length of civil trial (in years) in each region
against the latitude of the city where the main court in the region is
located: the regressions will also exploit variation over time. Fabbri and
Padula (2004) document cross-regional diﬀerences in the time evolution
of several proxies for the quality of judicial enforcement. In the ﬁgure
there is a clear and signiﬁcant geographical gradient, which shows that
in Southern regions the average trial takes nearly twice as long as in the
North. For example, Bolzano (which is near the Austrian border) has the
most eﬃcient court, and Catanzaro (in the far South) the least eﬃcient.
This shows that there are substantial diﬀerences between the regions:
the eﬀect of these diﬀerences will be studied in this paper.
To measure the availability of credit from informal sources, we exploit
the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a representative
survey of Italian households. This survey includes detailed questions
about household characteristics, income, spending and assets. In par-
ticular, it records information on debts held by diﬀerent lenders, such
as banks, other ﬁnancial institutions, and, importantly for us, informal
credit from friends or non co-resident relatives.
We construct an indicator of the availability of informal credit mar-
10kets by regressing a dummy for whether debt is held with relatives and
friends on the region and the year in which the household lives at the mo-
ment the household applies for credit, as well as income and squared in-
come, a dummy for couples, number of kids, a dummies for home-owners,
for self-employed and for not holding a bank account. This yields a house-
hold level indicator of the availability of alternative credit providers and
allows us to impute access to credit from informal sources (such as rel-
atives and friends) in the lender’s data. It measures the proportion of
households with the given characteristics who report that they have some
outstanding debt with friends, and/or family. This directly captures the
availability of alternative credit sources, but the eﬀect is uncertain. Re-
call that default will be more attractive if households can not be excluded
from access to credit in the future. Thus if access to informal credit is
more pervasive, then households have less incentive to repay debts in-
curred in the formal credit market. On the other hand, households may
borrow from family and friends to help them meet payments on their
formal credit contracts and therefore prevent default.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of the share of those borrowing from
friends and family for each Italian region, listed from North to South.
This is obtained by ﬁrst computing our measure of reliance on family
and friends ﬁnancial help and showing for each region a box that is
centered on the median and has left hinge equal to the 1st and right to
the 3rd quartile of the distribution of our proxy for relatives’ and friends’
ﬁnancial help. The graph shows that borrowing from friends and family
is more prevalent in some Southern regions, such as Puglia, Calabria, and
Sicilia, and that the prevalence is very limited in Sardina and Umbria.
The graph also uncovers substantial variability within each Italian region,
which suggests that the availability of informal sources of credit varies
11both between and within regions.
The Findomestic data records whether households default on their
debts. Figure 3 plots the proportion of loans that defaulted in each region
against its latitude. It clearly shows that relatively fewer households
repay their debts in the South than in the North. In the North, around
10 percent of households fail to repay their debts on schedule, but in
Calabria and Sicilia over 20 percent fail to repay on schedule, which is
twice that in Friuli and Veneto, for instance. These ﬁgures suggest a
positive relationship between the repayment of debts and the ease with
which borrowers can be punished if they default, which the rest of the
paper explores in more detail.
4 The econometric model
Our aim is to investigate the eﬀect of access to informal credit markets,
and of judicial enforcement on borrower behaviour in the consumer credit
market. We estimate upper and lower bounds of the eﬀect of judicial
enforcement and access to informal credit on repayment behaviour, and
assess whether such households are more likely to apply for credit. To
proceed, denote e as the repayment behaviour of the borrower, which
takes the value 1 if the debt is repaid on schedule and zero if any scheduled
repayment is missed. Denote by X a vector of observable characteristics
that might aﬀect the repayment behaviour. The vector X records the
variables that the lender observes in making their credit granting decision
and the additional variables that we have constructed. Finally, IG is a
binary variable that takes the value one if the credit request was granted,
and zero if it was refused.
If the loan was granted we observe the repayment behaviour of the
12borrower. Our exercise is to test how the household’s characteristics
aﬀect whether the borrower defaults. However, we wish to deduce repay-
ment behaviour accounting for the lending decision of our bank, which
requires us to predict the likely repayment behaviour of households whose
loan application was refused. How does the repayment behaviour of Ital-
ian households change with their characteristics? Obviously, to do this
we need to assume that households who apply for loans from our lender
are typical of all Italian applicants, e.g. given their observable charac-
teristics, there is no diﬀerence between customers with our lender and
customers who go elsewhere. This seems quite a strong assumption but
can be consistent with economic theory. It will be true if, for instance,
all lenders adopt the same strategy, conditional on the observable char-
acteristics X. This seems plausible if all ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizing in a
competitive market (or if they all have the same market power). It does
rule out lenders segmenting the market and adopting diﬀerent strategies.
For instance, in the US, ‘sub-prime lenders’ concentrate on low-income /
high risk households that are denied credit by more traditional lenders.
However, these type of sub-prime lenders did not operate in the Italian
credit market at this time.
We also need to make an additional assumption if our results are
representative of the whole Italian population: after accounting for the
variables X, knowing that the agent has applied for a loan, does not
predict whether it will be repaid. This is a much stronger assumption.
It rules out that agents who are predictably bad borrowers are applying
for credit.
134.1 The selection problem
We focus on the repayment behaviour of households and how repayment
is related to household characteristics. For any household with charac-
teristics X, their repayment probability is the sum of repayment if their
credit application was granted multiplied by the probability of credit be-
ing granted, and repayment if it was refused multiplied by the probability
of being refused credit.
E (e|X) = E (e|X,IG = 1|X)Pr(IG = 1|X)+E (e|X,IG = 0|X)∗Pr(IG = 0|X)
(1)
We directly observe whether the household was granted credit, hence we
know Pr(IG = 1|X), and since the household is either granted or refused
credit, we also know that Pr(IG = 0|X) = 1−Pr(IG = 1|X). Since the
household’s repayment behaviour is observed if it was granted credit, we
can also construct the sample analog of E (e|X,IG = 1). However, the
repayment behaviour of households refused credit can not be directly
observed hence we can not construct E (e|X,IG = 0). This is the selec-
tion problem: some way must be found to estimate E (e|X,IG = 0) from
what is observed, although we know it must lie between zero and one.
This selection issue is crucial if one wants to evaluate the determinants
of default. For instance, observing that default decreases with income
does not necessarily mean that poorer households are more likely to de-
fault if they also borrow less often. Similarly, if one is interested on the
time evolution of default, failing to account for the changing composition
of the pool of borrowers can be misleading about the true dynamics of
default.
Notice that if rejected applicants are less likely to repay (implying
14that lenders screen out bad risks), the sample analog of E (e|X,IG = 1)
overestimates E (e|X). While there are several standard econometric
techniques to handle this type of selection problem, each imposes eco-
nomic assumptions. We now discuss the economic assumptions that are
needed for identiﬁcation.
4.1.1 Selection by observables, i.e.“Rubin”
In matching models, there is some set of variables, W, by which observa-
tions are sorted. Households with the same W are matched: households
for which IG = 1 replace those households, with the same W, for which
IG = 0. Formally, this requires that:
e⊥IG|W
which implies that Pr(IG = 1|X,W,e) = Pr(IG = 1|X,W).7 In our
framework, this amounts to requiring that the set W aﬀects the credit
scoring algorithm, but not repayment behaviour. This is unlikely to be
satisﬁed by the data if the lender is rational and maximizes proﬁts. Why
would the lender use a variable in their screening procedure if it did not
aﬀect repayment behaviour? Hence this assumption seems inconsistent
with lender rationality. However, it will be satisﬁed, if, for instance,
the lender discriminates for non-economic reasons against subgroups in
society (such as ethnic minorities) but this would be inconsistent with
proﬁt maximization.
4.1.2 Selection by unobservables, i.e.“Heckman”
A second popular method of solving the selection problem is through
speciﬁcally modelling the selection process. Identiﬁcation using this
7Matching also requires the common support assumption to be satisﬁed. This
implies that 0 < Pr(IG = 1|X,W) < 1.
15method requires some exclusion restriction (except in the case of identiﬁ-
cation via functional form assumptions). Formally, identiﬁcation requires
that for some set of variables W we have:
(a) E (e|X) = E (e|X,W)
(b) Pr(IG = 1|W,X)  = Pr(IG = 1|X)
meaning that the W aﬀects whether the application is rejected but does
not aﬀect repayment. Assumptions (a) and (b) are not very attractive.
If W enters the screening procedure, then as before, rationality implies
that it is likely to aﬀect repayment behaviour.
4.1.3 The bounds
Neither selection by unobservables nor matching seem to be particularly
attractive with the data at hand. Both impose economic assumptions
that are diﬃcult to reconcile with lender rationality: lenders are likely to
include variables in their screening procedure only if they predict likely
repayment behaviour. However, if we make weaker assumptions, we can
place bounds on the estimated eﬀects of interest. Recall that we have
modelled whether the household repays, e, as a binary variable equal to
one if the debt is repaid on schedule, and zero if not. We can re-write
equation (1) as:
Pr(e = 1|X) = Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1) ∗ Pr(IG = 1|X)
+Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 0) ∗ Pr(IG = 0|X)
Recall that the data do not allow us to identify Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 0): we
cannot observe whether households repay (or would have repaid) their
loan if they were never granted credit. However, we know that the prob-
ability of repaying lies between zero and one, thus we can proceed as
16in Manski (1989), and place upper and lower bounds on the eﬀect of
the variables of interest. The lower bound assumes a zero probability
of repaying for those who are refused credit, while the upper that this
probability is one. This gives:
K0X = Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1) ∗ Pr(IG = 1|X)
≤ Pr(e = 1|X) ≤
Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1) ∗ Pr(IG = 1|X) + Pr(IG = 0|X) = K1X
(2)
That is, we deﬁne the lower bound as K0X and the upper bound as K1X.
These bounds can be identiﬁed since we have data on rejected applica-
tions, from which we can construct the probability that a credit applica-
tion was granted, Pr(IG = 1|X), and since we observe the repayment be-
haviour of households granted credit we can construct Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1).
Suppose now that we want to measure the eﬀect of access to informal
credit markets, measured by the incidence of ﬁnancial help from friends
and family, on default rates. If one had point identiﬁcation, the eﬀect
of family ﬁnancial help is captured by the relevant β in the estimation
of Pr(e = 1|Xβ). Otherwise, we could split the sample by whether the
reliance on family ﬁnancial help is high (above median) or low. Deﬁning
Z = H if the reliance is high and Z = L if it is low, the diﬀerence in
eﬀort across high and low reliance is:
Pr
￿




e = 1| ˜ X,Z = H
￿
where we partition X into ˜ X and Z. This probability is bounded between
17K1XL − K0XH and K0XL − K1XH, where:
K0XL = Pr
￿










































IG = 1| ˜ X,Z = H
￿i
The intuition is simple. Suppose that the eﬀect of Z on repayment is
positive, then the smallest diﬀerence between a high value Z = H and a
low value Z = L for access to credit from family and friends Z is given
by K1XL − K0XH. Here, K1XL represents the highest possible value for
when Z = L while K0XH represents the lowest possible value for when
Z = H. In contrast the largest diﬀerence is given by K0XL − K1XH, the
diﬀerence between the lowest possible value when Z = L and the highest
possible value when Z = H. Hence the diﬀerence in the estimated eﬀect
of when Z is high, and when Z is low, must be between K1XL − K0XH
and K0XL −K1XH. If, instead, the eﬀect of Z is negative, K1XH −K0XL
becomes the lower bound, and K0XH − K1XL the upper bound.
4.1.4 Tightening the bounds
Suitable assumptions tighten the bounds, which could otherwise be large.
Lenders have strong incentives to refuse credit to households which are
less likely to repay their debts, hence households refused credit are likely
to be worse credit risks. If this were not true then it would imply lenders
were rejecting low risk and accepting high risk applicants, which would
be inconsistent with their motive to screen customers, and with proﬁt
18maximization. If rejected applicants are weakly less likely to repay their
debts than households whose application was accepted then:
Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 0) ≤ Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1)
Using this inequality means that equation (2) becomes:
Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1)∗Pr(IG = 1|X) ≤ Pr(e = 1|X) ≤ Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1) = ˜ K1X
(3)
which narrows the bounds, since the upper boundary, ˜ K1X, is now tighter.
With these narrower bounds the eﬀect of informal credit markets, mea-
sured by the extent of lending through friends and family, is instead
bounded between ˜ K1XL − K0XH and K0XL − ˜ K1XH where:
˜ K1XL = Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1,Z = L)
˜ K1XH = Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1,Z = H)
5 Estimation
In order to estimate the bounds one needs the sample analog of Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1)
and Pr(IG = 1|X). We will use both a fully parametric estimator and a
semi-parametric estimator to construct these probabilities. Calculating
the lower bound means estimating:
Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1)Pr(IG = 1|X) (4)
which is equivalent to estimating:
E (e   IG|X) (5)
That is, estimating the lower boundary is equivalent to estimating the
proportion of households who are both granted credit and repay that
credit on time. While for the upper bound estimating:
Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1)Pr(IG = 1|X) + Pr(IG = 0|X) (6)
19is equivalent to estimating:
E (e   IG − IG|X) + 1 = 1 − E(IG(1 − e)|X) (7)
That is, estimating the lower boundary is equivalent to estimating one
minus the proportion of households who are both granted credit and do
not repay that credit on time. Lastly, the tightened upper bound is the
probability that a household which is given credit repays the debt. This
is the same as a naive estimate (which ignores selection) of the eﬀect of
the variable of interest on repayment behaviour. The upper, tightened
upper and lower boundaries are easily calculated.
The parametric estimation of the lower, upper and tightened upper
bound is straightforward. We use standard probit regressions to pro-
vide the ﬁrst set of results. Additionally, we estimate the lower, upper
and tightened upper bound by using a semi-parametric approach. Pro-
bit regression is a maximum likelihood estimator which maximizes the
function:
ΠiF(Xiβ)
di [1 − F(Xiβ)]
1−di
where di is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the event
happens (for example, that both credit is granted and the debt is repaid
on schedule for the lower bound), and zero otherwise. Probit regressions
make parametric assumptions about both the functional form of the index
function Xiβ and the distribution of the error term, assuming that F is
the normal distribution.
In order to free our estimates from distributional assumptions, we
also employ a semi-parametric estimator. The tighten upper bound to
the probability of repayment, Pr(e = 1|X,IG = 1), is estimated by min-
imizing the sample analog of:
20 e − E(e|IG = 1,X) 
where we approximate E(e|IG = 1,X) with a fourth order polynomial
in a linear index, Xβ.8 This procedure is similar to that suggested by
Ichimura (1993), with two important diﬀerences. First, Ichimura employs
kernel methods as approximation method while we favour series due to
the large dimensionality of our problem. Second, while we are only in-
terested in the probabilities, Ichimura’s focus is on the estimation of β,
which represents a more diﬃcult task. The probability of the application
not being rejected is estimated in a similar way and the lower and upper
bounds are computed using (4) and (6), respectively.
Standard errors are obtained by a two stages bootstrap: in the ﬁrst
we bootstrap the sample used to compute our indicator of relatives’ and
friends’ ﬁnancial help, in the second we bootstrap the sample drawn from
our lender archives.
6 Results
Table 2 presents estimates of the bounds to the probability of repayment.
We concentrate on installment credit contracts, although results are simi-
lar for revolving credit contracts and personal loans. The columns report
the lower and the upper bound, as well as the tightened upper bound,
which is the naive estimate without controlling for selection. All regres-
sions feature a time trend and agency dummies, which implies that our
estimates are not biased by unobservable time and geographic eﬀects.9
8Trying higher order polynomials does not aﬀect the results. Consistency relies on
the correlation between the higher order terms and the error, deﬁned as e−E(e|IG =
1,X), to vanish as the sample size grows.
9Agency dummies are deﬁned on the basis of the province where the agency dealing
with the contract is located. Italy is divided into 20 regions and about 100 provinces.
21The results in the ﬁrst column show that the lower bound to the
probability of repayment is an increasing and concave function of job
seniority and income. This is consistent with the intuitive notion that
wealthier households are less likely to default, though at a decreasing
pace. The lower bound is higher for home-owners and lower for self-
employed. The former are typically stable income earners, while for the
latter, income is typically more volatile and risky, which makes default
more likely.
Our measure of the quality of judicial enforcement, the average length
of civil trials, reduces the lower bound to the probability of repaying. The
proportion of households which repay their loans decreases signiﬁcantly
as reliance on friends and family for ﬁnancial help increases. The degree
of competition in the credit market, measured by the number of bank
branches per bank in the province, is instead positively correlated with
the proportion of households who repay. The eﬀect of access to credit
from family and friends accords with the idea that those who have better
outside options are more likely to default. Even if they are permanently
excluded from the formal credit market, they can still borrow from friends
and family in the informal credit market.
The results in the second column of table 2 refer to the upper bound
to the probability of repayment. The estimated coeﬃcients have the
same sign, except for the degree of competition, measured by the number
of branches per bank in the province, which switches from positive to
negative. We interpret this result as reﬂecting that higher competition
causes lenders to weaken credit standards, which reduces the average
quality of the borrower and raises ex post default rates. The upper bound
is an increasing and concave function of both job tenure and income, is
higher among home-owners and lower among self-employed. Judicial
22enforcement and reliance on family and friends ﬁnancial help reduce the
upper bound.
The last column refers to the tightened upper bound, which is the
probability of repaying among those actually given credit. It is also the
estimate had we ignored selection and focussed on the sample of non-
rejected applications. The results imply that the probability of repaying
is an increasing and concave function of income and job-tenure, is higher
among home-owner, lower among self-employed and those who do not
hold a bank account, and is negatively related to length of trials, ﬁnancial
help from family and friends. If selection is not an issue, the changes in
the probability of repayment can be inferred from the coeﬃcients shown
in the last column of table 2, which focuses on the probability of repay-
ment among non-rejected applicants. However, the selection issue arises
as the sample of rejected applications is likely to be diﬀerent from the
applications which are not rejected.
In order to appreciate the importance of selection, we explore how
repayment changes if, say, the value of the index of reliance on friends’
and relatives’ ﬁnancial help increases from the minimum to the maximum
value of its distribution. If there is a selection problem (refused and
accepted credit applications are systematically diﬀerent) then the upper
and lower bounds to the probability of repayment can still be constructed
as described in section 4. Two situations may arise: either the lower and
upper bounds to the changes in the repayment probability have the same
sign, (both negative or both positive) or they have diﬀerent signs. In the
former instance, we can identify the sign of the eﬀect of the variable of
interest (since the true eﬀect is somewhere between the upper and lower
bound), in the latter case we can not. The results are reported in table 3
and refer to home-ownership, job tenure, income, length of trials, number
23of branches and our indicator of reliance on family and friends ﬁnancial
help.
The ﬁrst row of table 3 focuses on the eﬀect of home-ownership and
is obtained by setting the home-owner dummy to 0 and 1 in turn, eval-
uating the lower, the upper and the tighten upper bounds for the two
values of the home-owner dummy and bounding the amount by which the
probability of repayment changes with the home-ownership status as de-
scribed in section 4.1.4. For presentation purposes, the bounds are then
averaged across the sample. The other rows of the table are obtained in
a similar way.
The ﬁrst column of the table 3 shows how much the probability of
repayment changes with home-ownership if one ignores selection. Ignor-
ing selection, the global eﬀect of home-ownership on repayment implies
that home-owners are 1.6% more likely to repay than non-home owners.
The other columns of the table allow for non-random selection and show
that switching the home-owner dummy from 0 to 1 causes the change in
the probability of repaying to be bounded between -0.085 (with standard
error equal to 0.003) and 0.143 (0.003) if one uses the upper bound, and
from -0.061 (0.003) and 0.128 (0.003) if one uses the tightened upper
bound. Hence, one cannot rule out that the eﬀect of home-ownership
on repayment is zero. Therefore, neglecting the selection problem can
lead to unwarranted conclusions. The lower bound increases with home-
ownership, a likely consequence of the loan selection process, but not
enough: the lower bound for home-owners is smaller than the upper
bound for non home-owners, everything else equal. The eﬀect of home-
ownership on the probability of repayment can be visualized from ﬁgure 4.
The ﬁgure plots the lower (solid line), upper (dotted) and tighten upper
(dashed) bounds of the probability of repayment as function of home-
24ownership status. The ﬁgure clariﬁes why we cannot rule out zero eﬀect:
one could draw a straight line without crossing any of the bounds.
The global eﬀect of raising both income and job tenure is negative
if one ignores selection (respectively, -0.421 and -0.374). Accounting for
selection implies the eﬀect of job tenure is bounded between -0.808 (0.014)
and -0.283 (0.137) and that of income between -0.785 (0.200) and -0.245
(0.346). Whether or not one ignores selection, the eﬀect of job tenure
and income on repayment is negative. This is due to the probability of
repayment not being a monotone function of job tenure and income, as
shown in ﬁgures 5 and 6, which plot the bounds to the probability of
repaying against, respectively, the distribution of job tenure and income
and imply that the probability of repayment is a concave function of job
tenure and income.
The sign of the eﬀect of length of trial is not identiﬁed, as shown in
ﬁgure 7, which plots the bounds to the probability of repayment against
length of trial. The eﬀect is bounded between -0.182 (0.010) and 0.054
(0.009) using the wide bounds and between -0.166 (0.010) and 0.026
(0.010) using the tightened bounds. Since zero lies between the upper
and the lower bounds we cannot rule out that there is no eﬀect. The
results on enforcement are not entirely surprising, since consumer credit
is unsecured and collateral is the main channel through which the quality
of enforcement aﬀects borrowers’ behaviour.10
Increasing the number of branches per banks in the province reduces
repayment. The change in the probability of repayment are bounded
from below and from above by a negative number: by between -0.168
(0.032) and -0.029 (0.034) or -0.146 (0.033) and -0.019 (0.035) using the
tighten bounds. However, since the upper bounds to the changes are not
10This does not rule out that there is an eﬀect of enforcement on loan selection.
25very precisely estimated, the results do not rule out either a positive or
a negative eﬀect of banking concentration on repayment.
Increasing access to credit from friends and family reduces the prob-
ability of repayment by between -0.459 (0.039) and -0.015 (0.029) or by
0.454 (0.04) and -0.121 (0.039) using the tightened bounds. It supports
the hypothesis that the availability of informal credit weakens incentives
to repay. This is also clear from ﬁgure 8, which plots the lower, upper
and tighten upper bounds to the probability of repaying as function of
relatives’ and friends’ ﬁnancial help. We now turn to the semi-parametric
results.
6.1 Semi-parametric results
The semi-parametric results are broadly consistent with the paramet-
ric. However, for job tenure and for income, abandoning the parametric
assumptions makes identiﬁcation harder, as shown in ﬁgure 9 and 10.
Figure 11 shows that the upper and the tightened upper bounds increase
with the length of trials, while the lower bound is ﬂat. This implies that
one cannot exclude that judicial enforcement does not aﬀect the prob-
ability of repaying. The eﬀect of borrowing from relatives and friends
on the probability of repaying is shown in ﬁgure 12. The ﬁgure shows
that the lower, the upper and the tightened upper bounds decrease as
ﬁnancial help from family and friends increases. The decrease is sizable
and statistically signiﬁcant, as shown by the diamonds, the plus, and
the stars placed two standard deviations above and below the lower, the
upper and the tighten upper bound.
As before, we quantify the eﬀect on the probability moving from the
minimum to the maximum of each of the variables of interest. The eﬀect
of home-owning on probability of repaying is between -0.111 (0.007) and
260.116 (0.007), or -0.088 (0.007) and 0.098 (0.008) using the tightened
bounds. The eﬀects of job tenure and income is not identiﬁed. Increas-
ing job-tenure causes the probability of repayment to change by between
-0.161 (0.029) and 0.150 (0.005) or by between -0.135 (0.005) and 0.121
(0.004) if using the tightened bounds; for increasing income, the proba-
bility of repayment is bounded between -0.178 (0.025) and 0.131 (0.012)
or by -0.153 (0.025) and 0.098 (0.016).
The eﬀect of the degree of banks competition on repayment is negative
and is bounded between -0.653 (0.031) and -0.180 (0.029) if one uses
the tightened bounds. The eﬀect of judicial enforcement is instead not
identiﬁed: the changes of the probability of repayment are bounded by
a negative number from below and a positive number from above. For
access to credit from family and friends, the probability of defaulting
decreases by between -0.576 (0.044) and -0.322 (0.072) on the tightened
upper bound.
6.2 Robustness checks
Our deﬁnition of default focuses on expired contracts only and neglects
those contracts that are still alive in 1999, the date at which the data
are drawn from our lender archive. Therefore, compared to the whole
population of contracts, the selected contracts are on average older, which
might be source of concern if the composition of costumers changes over
time. We then extend our deﬁnition of default to include also not expired
contracts and estimate the lower, the upper and the tighten upper bounds
both parametrically and semi-parametrically.
The parametric results are reported in table 5 and are consistent with
the results obtained on the expired contracts only. The lower, the upper
and the tighten upper bounds are larger for home-owners, smaller for
27self-employed and for those who do not hold a bank account. Moreover,
the bounds to the probability of repaying are increasing and concave in
job tenure and income, and decrease with the length of trials and with
the reliance on relatives’ and friends’ ﬁnancial help. Table 6 quantiﬁes
the eﬀect on the probability of repayment of changing home-ownership
status, job tenure, income, degree of banks competition, length of trials
and reliance on relatives’ and friends’ ﬁnancial help. The results conﬁrms
that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial help is negative and do not rule out a zero
eﬀect of judicial enforcement. The same message is conveyed by the
semi-parametric results. Figure 13 and 14 plot the lower, upper and
tighten upper bounds to the probability of repayment as function of
judicial enforcement and ﬁnancial help respectively. Again, the former
eﬀect is not identiﬁed, but the latter is clearly negative.
As further check, we split our sample between Northern and South-
ern Italian provinces. If our results on family and friends ﬁnancial help
are solely driven by the North-South divide, one should see the eﬀect of
ﬁnancial help from relatives and friends to disappear when focussing on
the North or on the South separately. Tables 7 and 8 report the para-
metric estimates for Northern and Southern provinces and reveal that
the splitting the sample between North and South does not change the
overall picture. Both for Northern and Southern provinces, the lower,
upper and tightened upper bounds decrease with the reliance on rela-
tives’ and friends’ ﬁnancial help. Figures 15 and 16 focus on the semi-
parametric estimates instead, conﬁrms that the lower upper and tighten
upper bounds decreases with reliance on family and friends ﬁnancial help
both for Northern and Southern provinces, but imply that the eﬀect is
identiﬁed only for Southern provinces. This means that the diﬀerence be-
tween markets and institutions between Northern and Southern provinces
28is part of the story, but cannot explain fully our results.
7 Conclusions
Using a leading Italian lender’s administrative data on credit applica-
tions, we are able to assess how features of the market aﬀect repayment
behaviour. Identifying the factors aﬀecting repayment is not trivial. A
selection issue arises because we do not observe the repayment behaviour
of those households that were refused credit. Two popular methods for
addressing selection require imposing the economic restriction that the
lender’s screening procedure is unrelated to the potential borrowers re-
payment behaviour, which is unlikely to be satisﬁed. At the cost of losing
point identiﬁcation, we impose less stringent assumptions and provide
upper and lower bounds of the likely eﬀect of the variables of interest.
Moreover, we show that plausible economic assumptions (that loans are
made to less risky households) can reduce the size of these bounds.
In this study we investigate the eﬀect of judicial institutions, of infor-
mal credit and of bank competition on repayment. We measure judicial
enforcement with the average length of civil trials, while we use credit
from friends and family to measure the availability of informal sources
of credit. We also measure competition using the total number of bank
branches in each province. Our results show that the quality of judicial
enforcement makes little diﬀerence to whether the borrower defaults or
repays his loan. In contrast, access to credit from friends and family has
large eﬀects (the bounds exclude zero from the conﬁdence interval). The
eﬀect of informal credit markets on whether the debt was repaid is both
economically and statistically signiﬁcant. This large eﬀect is consistent
with theory. Recall that both Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota
29(1996) argued that incentives to repay depended on the punishment for
default. For the small unsecured loans that our lender specializes in, the
judicial process is relatively unimportant since it is rarely invoked. This
is perhaps unsurprising given the small size of the typical loan that we
examine, and the fact that these loans are uncollateralized. The eﬀect
of judicial enforcement is economically small (one tenth of the eﬀect of
family and friends) and statistically insigniﬁcant. Instead, defaulters are
punished by being denied further loans. But this means that borrowing
from family and friends improves the household’s outside option and re-
duces the penalty for default. Households with access to these informal
credit markets view exclusion from the formal credit market as less oner-
ous since they can still borrow from friends and family should the need
arrive. Thus, if households have alternative credit sources (through infor-
mal credit markets provided by family and friends) then their incentives
to repay debts in the formal market are much lower.
These results - that access to informal sources of credit increase the
default rate in the formal sector - suggests that there is moral hazard, in
the sense that access to credit from family and friends reduces repayment
in the formal sector. However, unlike conventional moral hazard where
the loan from the lender changes repayment behaviour on that loan, we
instead show that access to alternative credit sources changes repayment
behaviour on the loan granted by the lender.
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Note. The length of trial refers to the average length of civil trials in the main city in
each Italian judicial district, measured in years. Data constructed from the Annuario
di Statistiche Giudiziarie for 1989-2000, published by ISTAT.
34Table 1: Summary statistics
SHIW Findomestic Findomestic
All contracts Not-rejected contracts
1995 1998 1996 1998 1996 1998
North 48.63 48.02 32.55 32.32 33.79 31.84
Central 18.25 19.06 24.77 22.29 26.96 22.92
South 33.22 32.92 42.68 45.39 39.25 45.23
Home-owner 65.66 66.6 41.87 43.62 47.10 46.37
Income 25,510 27,337 14,498 14,641 15,360 15,050
Self-employed 16.36 16.88 13.98 12.85 13.01 12.83
No bank account 31.41 27.2 55.49 60.85 49.84 59.30
N. of obs. 8,135 7,147 10,645 28,998 7,700 24,802
Note. The statistics from SHIW are computed using sample weights. For the Findo-
mestic sample, rejected and not-rejected contracts for expired contracts are included in
the third and fourth column; the ﬁfth and the sixth columns focus on the not-rejected
contracts only. Income is expressed in 2000 prices. The number of observations is
maximum number of non-missing observations across the variables summarized in the
table.
35Table 2: Parametric estimates of the bounds on the probability of not-
defaulting.
Tightened
Lower Bound Upper Bound Upper Bound
Home-owner 0.166 0.033 0.069
(0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
Job tenure 0.386 0.071 0.167
(0.031)*** (0.016)*** (0.019)***
Squared job tenure -0.081 -0.010 -0.032
(0.011)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
Income 0.129 0.047 0.072
(0.017)*** (0.014)*** (0.011)***
Income-squared -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Length of trials -0.048 -0.063 -0.070
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)***
Number of branches -0.000 -0.003 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Self-employed -0.199 -0.164 -0.190
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)***
No bank account -0.301 -0.298 -0.323
(0.017)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)***
Reliance on friends ﬁnancial help -2.362 -0.693 -1.354
(0.249)*** (0.232)*** (0.254)***
Observations 84,613 84,613 74,685
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The regression
also included a full set of provincial and year dummies. Income is in 10,000 Euros.
36Table 3: Changes in the probability of defaulting: parametric estimates
No selection K1XL − K0XH K0XL − K1XH ˜ K1XL − K0XH K0XL − ˜ K1XH Mean
Home-owner 0.016 -0.085 0.143 -0.061 0.128 0.445
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Job tenure -0.421 -0.841 0.120 -0.808 -0.283 0.820
(0.138)** (0.014)*** (0.093) (0.014)*** (0.137)*
Income -0.374 -0.815 -0.050 -0.785 -0.245 1.468
(0.347) (0.200)*** (0.305) (0.200)*** (0.346)
Length of trials -0.075 -0.182 0.054 -0.166 0.026 3.023
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)**
Number of branches -0.129 -0.168 -0.029 -0.146 -0.019 50.289
(0.034)*** (0.032)*** (0.034) (0.033)*** (0.035)
Reliance on friends -0.183 -0.459 -0.015 -0.454 -0.121 0.099
(0.039)*** (0.039)*** (0.029) (0.040)*** (0.039)**
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The last column
reports the means of the variables given in left-hand column. The length of trials is
expressed in years.
37Table 4: Changes in the probability of defaulting: semi-parametric esti-
mates
K1XL − K0XH K0XL − K1XH ˜ K1XL − K0XH K0XL − ˜ K1XH
Home-owner -0.111 0.116 -0.088 0.098
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***
Job tenure -0.161 0.150 -0.135 0.121
(0.029)*** (0.005)*** (0.029)*** (0.004)***
Income -0.178 0.131 -0.153 0.098
(0.025)*** (0.012)*** (0.025)*** (0.016)***
Length of trials -0.122 0.132 -0.092 0.112
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
Number of branches -0.703 0.278 -0.653 -0.180
(0.034)*** (0.050)*** (0.031)*** (0.029)***
Reliance on friends -0.608 0.098 -0.576 -0.322
(0.046)*** (0.096) (0.044)*** (0.072)***
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The last column
reports the means of the variables given in left-hand column. The length of trials is
expressed in years.
38Table 5: Parametric estimates of the bounds on the probability of not-
defaulting: expired and not-expired contracts.
Tightened
Lower Bound Upper Bound Upper Bound
Home-owner 0.164 0.054 0.082
(0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)***
Job tenure 0.357 0.103 0.172
(0.021)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
Squared job tenure -0.074 -0.017 -0.032
(0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Income 0.119 0.057 0.075
(0.013)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
Income-squared -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Length of trials -0.019 -0.032 -0.039
(0.010)* (0.007)* (0.008)*
Number of branches -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Self-employed -0.189 -0.165 -0.183
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)***
No bank account -0.277 -0.275 -0.291
(0.016)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
Reliance on friends ﬁnancial help -2.189 -0.791 -1.312
(0.260)*** (0.202)*** (0.231)***
Observations 114,257 114,257 104,246
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The regression
also included a full set of provincial and year dummies. Income is in 10,000 Euros.
39Table 6: Changes in the probability of defaulting: parametric estimates,
expired and not-expired contracts.
No selection K1XL − K0XH K0XL − K1XH ˜ K1XL − K0XH K0XL − ˜ K1XH
Home-owner 0.018 -0.057 0.114 -0.041 0.104
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
Job tenure -0.414 -0.843 -0.010 -0.820 -0.307
(0.086)*** (0.011)*** (0.064) (0.011)*** (0.085)***
Income -0.439 -0.701 -0.265 -0.681 -0.341
(0.309) (0.218)** (0.308) (0.218)** (0.307)
Length of trials -0.038 -0.114 0.061 -0.103 0.042
(0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)***
Number of branches -0.083 -0.117 -0.011 -0.100 0.002
(0.033)* (0.050)* (0.027) (0.052) (0.037)
Reliance on friends -0.168 -0.395 -0.042 -0.393 -0.121
(0.034)*** (0.041)*** (0.026) (0.043)*** (0.035)***
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The last column
reports the means of the variables given in left-hand column. The length of trials is
expressed in years.
40Table 7: Parametric estimates of the bounds on the probability of not-
defaulting, North.
Tightened
Lower Bound Upper Bound Upper Bound
Home-owner 0.245 0.081 0.121
(0.016)*** (0.018)*** (0.019)***
Job tenure 0.492 0.105 0.203
(0.049)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)***
Squared job tenure -0.105 -0.016 -0.039
(0.018)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)***
Income 0.134 0.070 0.092
(0.036)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)***
Income-squared -0.006 -0.002 -0.003
(0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Length of trials -0.015 -0.039 -0.038
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of branches -0.001 -0.007 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Self-employed -0.224 -0.187 -0.211
(0.019)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)***
No bank account -0.199 -0.165 -0.185
(0.022)*** (0.024)*** (0.026)***
Reliance on friends ﬁnancial help -2.801 -1.145 -1.791
(0.372)*** (0.433)*** (0.463)***
Observations 46,186 46,186 41,085
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The regression
also included a full set of provincial and year dummies. Income is in 10,000 Euros.
41Table 8: Parametric estimates of the bounds on the probability of not-
defaulting, South.
Tightened
Lower Bound Upper Bound Upper Bound
Home-owner 0.103 -0.004 0.030
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)***
Job tenure 0.277 0.035 0.127
(0.029)*** (0.022)*** (0.023)***
Squared job tenure -0.056 -0.002 -0.023
(0.010)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
Income 0.126 0.013 0.046
(0.023)*** (0.028)*** (0.016)***
Income-squared -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.002)
Length of trials -0.081 -0.081 -0.098
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)***
Number of branches 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Self-employed -0.184 -0.162 -0.186
(0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.024)***
No bank account -0.451 -0.492 -0.521
(0.024)*** (0.021)*** (0.022)***
Reliance on friends ﬁnancial help -1.825 -0.214 -0.851
(0.304)*** (0.311)*** (0.333)***
Observations 38,427 38,427 33,600
Note. Bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis. ⋆ means signiﬁcant at 5 percent level,
⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ⋆⋆⋆ signiﬁcant at 0.1 percent level. The regression
also included a full set of provincial and year dummies. Income is in 10,000 Euros.
42Figure 2: Reliance on Family and Friends


















Note. The ﬁgure plots the distribution of the percentage of households reporting that
they are borrowing from informal sources of credit in each Italian region. The boxes
are centered on the regional median, the left hinge refers to the 1st quartile, the right
hinge to the 3rd, the horizontal lines connect the 1s quartile with the lower adjacent
value and the 3rd with the upper. Dots refer to observations outside the range between
the lower value adjacent to the 1st quartile, and the upper value adjacent to the 3rd
quartile.
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Note. The default rate is calculated using the Findomestic data and reports the
percentage of contracts which have missed three or more payments when they have
been due. Latitude refers to the latitude of the main city in each Italian region.
44Figure 4: The probability of repaying and home-ownership: parametric
estimates












Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
45Figure 5: The probability of repaying and job tenure: parametric esti-
mates









Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
46Figure 6: The probability of repaying and income: parametric estimates











Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
47Figure 7: The probability of repaying and judicial enforcement: para-
metric estimates







Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
48Figure 8: The probability of repaying and family ﬁnancial help: para-
metric estimates








Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
49Figure 9: The probability of repaying and job tenure: semi-parametric
estimates








Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
50Figure 10: The probability of repaying and income: semi-parametric
estimates








Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
51Figure 11: The probability of repaying and judicial enforcement: semi-
parametric estimates







Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
52Figure 12: The probability of repaying and family ﬁnancial help: semi-
parametric estimates











Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
53Figure 13: The probability of repaying and judicial enforcement: semi-
parametric estimates, expired and not-expired contracts












Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
54Figure 14: The probability of repaying and family ﬁnancial help: semi-
parametric estimates, expired and not-expired contracts











Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
55Figure 15: The probability of repaying and family ﬁnancial help: semi-
parametric estimates, North









Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
56Figure 16: The probability of repaying and family ﬁnancial help: semi-
parametric estimates, South












Note. Solid line represents the ‘upper’ bound, dotted line the ‘lower’ bound and the
dashed line the ‘tightened upper’ bound, with diamonds, stars, and crosses the 2
standard deviation intervals around the estimate.
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